SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
SCHEDULE 13D
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Telephone and Data
Systems, Inc.
O. Mason Hawkins
Chairman of the Board and C.E.O.
and
Andrew R. McCarroll
Vice President & General Counsel
Southeastern Asset Management, Inc.
6410 Poplar Avenue; Suite 900
Memphis, TN 38119
(901) 761-2474 May 5, 2009
***
Item 4. Purpose of
Transaction
Item 4 of Southeastern’s
previously filed Schedule 13D entitled “Purpose of Transaction” is hereby
amended and supplemented by adding the following at the end thereof:
In anticipation of next
week’s Shareholder Forum meeting regarding strategic opportunities currently
available to the Issuer (see www.shareholderforum.com/tds), Southeastern
would like to be more specific about recommendations it has made to the
Issuer’s management and/or directors over the last few months regarding
opportunities to enhance value for all shareholders. We encourage other
shareholders and industry participants to consider these alternatives and
share their views, since we believe the company is at a critical juncture
and poor decision making can severely damage opportunities to recognize the
company’s value.
First, Southeastern has
recommended that the Issuer sell itself or its wireless assets to a national
wireless carrier. Southeastern believes that much greater value can be
recognized for shareholders today through a sale than if the company remains
independent going forward. Management and the Board disagree. We have not
been satisfied with management’s responses justifying remaining independent
and encourage other shareholders to express their views.
Second, in the absence
of the Issuer’s willingness to put itself and/or the wireless assets up for
sale, Southeastern has recommended that the Issuer simplify its capital
structure. Specifically, our most recent recommendation has been that the
Issuer combine its common and special common stock into a single class, and
spin off US Cellular, as more particularly described on Exhibit A. There are
a number of benefits we see in taking these steps, the most important of
which is that the separate pieces of this business are less likely to trade
at a discount. With greater liquidity in the TDS common and US Cellular
shares, and greater transparency regarding the underlying industry exposure,
we believe the public share price will move closer to the value of these
businesses. In addition, if management and the Board ever agree with our
conclusion that a sale is the best strategic option, then the company will
be better positioned to accomplish a transaction.
Third, we continue to
believe that the Issuer’s current stock price represents a significant
discount to the value of the underlying assets. Accordingly, we have
recommended that management direct its significant cash on hand to share
repurchase. This action would not be inconsistent with our prior two
recommendations. On the contrary, it would only enhance the value
recognition opportunity those two strategic alternatives represent. To
assist management in making the share repurchase as productive as possible,
Southeastern has recommended that the Issuer conduct a Dutch tender for 20
million shares. To allay management’s concerns that sufficient shares might
not be tendered, Southeastern has committed, subject to execution of
appropriate documentation, to backstop up to 50% of that Dutch tender.
While Southeastern believes intrinsic value to be higher than the backstop
price, Southeastern would prefer to part with a portion of its position to
facilitate management’s move to a public-shareholder mindset rather than
retain its entire position under a management which disregards public
shareholders. As such, we support a Dutch tender whether or not we are
called on to provide this backstop.
Finally, as an owner of
this company since 2001, Southeastern has become increasingly frustrated
with having to plead with management to act for the benefit of public
shareholders. Our 14a-8 shareholder proposal contained in the Issuer’s Proxy
Statement provides greater detail on the history of Southeastern’s
recommendations and management’s responses. While we bought the company with
knowledge that it was family controlled, we trusted management and the Board
would act responsibly for all owners. Because the Issuer’s management and
policies have been focused more on the controlling shareholder than public
shareholders, we believe it is important to send a message that the public
shareholder voice should be heard. Accordingly, we recommend that company
shareholders vote FOR our shareholder proposal to recapitalize the company’s
equity structure into one class of common stock, with one vote for each
share. Because the TDS Voting Trust has announced its intention to vote
against this proposal, a shareholder’s vote in favor makes it clear that he
or she is not satisfied with the direction the controlling shareholder has
taken the company.
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