Editor’s Note:
Jen Sisson is
the Chief Executive Officer and Severine
Neervoort is
a Global Policy Director at International Corporate Governance
Network (ICGN). This post is based on their ICGN memorandum. |
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) would like to
offer its perspective to the Subcommittee on Capital Markets on the
role and influence of proxy advisory firms, ahead of the hearing
taking place on 29 April on this topic. We would appreciate it if you
would add our letter to the official record.
Led by investors responsible for assets under management of >US$90
trillion, ICGN promotes high standards of corporate governance and
investor stewardship globally. Our membership is based in more than 40
countries, and comprises asset owners, asset managers, and advisers.
We are concerned by the fact that many parties continue to either
misunderstand, or wilfully misrepresent, the role proxy advice and
proxy research providers play in the voting process. We are worried
that a hearing entitled “Exposing the Proxy Advisory Cartel: How ISS &
Glass Lewis Influence Markets” does not create a helpful environment
for an unbiased, factual, and balanced conversation. In this context,
we want to make sure that the Subcommittee can hear the perspective of
institutional investors, who are the main users of proxy research.
Stewardship
is a fundamental aspect of an investor’s fiduciary duty to protect and
enhance long-term value for beneficiaries and clients, such as
pensioners and retail investors. ICGN defines stewardship as the
responsible allocation, management, and oversight of capital to
protect and enhance long-term value for beneficiaries and clients. An
important aspect of investor stewardship is voting on major issues
affecting investee companies, for example on capital allocation
matters, incentive schemes, and appointment of directors.
Investors inform and make their voting decisions based on myriad
inputs, such as in-house voting policy, investment thesis, engagement
with the company, as well as internal and external research. Exactly
what these inputs are vary by manager and investment approach. Proxy
advisors are one such input. As fiduciaries and investment experts,
the investor organisations who use these services do so to help them
meet their client needs and fiduciary duties.
Proxy advisors provide useful company-specific research and analysis
which helps investors make informed decisions. They also help
investors in their voting execution, by making it possible for
investors to vote across thousands of company meetings. However, there
are some misconceptions on the influence of proxy advisors. It is
important to remember that the investor remains the decision-maker.
Proxy advisors don’t vote. Investors do.
A vast majority of institutional investors have their own voting
guidelines, which are implemented by their proxy advisors through
customised voting policies. Proxy advisors have specific agreements
with each of their clients and act on the instructions of those
clients.
Furthermore, proxy advisors’ benchmark policies reflect the voting
preferences of their clients and are developed after regular and
extensive client outreach. Proxy advisors regularly consult with their
clients to understand what information and data points are useful to
them and should therefore be included in their research reports. They
also consult on the evolution of their own voting policy direction to
reflect evolving clients’ views.
As a result, the market may observe a correlation between the vote
recommendations by proxy advisors and significant votes against
management at company Annual General Meetings (AGMs). This correlation
should not be confused with causation. If there is a causal link, it
is rather that proxy advisors have been asked by their clients to flag
certain issues through their vote recommendations.
The UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) commissioned independent
research to investigate the influence and impact of proxy advisors on
FTSE 350 companies’ actions and investors’ voting decisions .
The research found that “the nature and extent of this influence may
be more nuanced and less clear-cut than is believed to be the case by
many companies, stakeholders and other commentators.”
Additionally, we would note that use of outsourced service providers
can support quality client service and value, by reducing costs. Undue
interference with the use of any relevant service providers for asset
management firms, pension schemes, 401k providers, and other
investment product providers, risks adding costs to the end
beneficiary, which may then negatively impact long-term returns.
We would be happy to discuss our perspective with you directly and
include some of our global institutional investor members who
subscribe to these services, if that would be helpful.
1 UK Financial Reporting Council,
Analytical report: The influence of proxy advisors and ESG rating
agencies on the actions and reporting of FTSE350 companies and
investor voting (June 2023).(go
back)
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