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Dell Inc.

appraisal rights for intrinsic value realization

and

Walgreen Co.

stock buyback policies

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Survey explaining accepted wisdom of using corporate capital for buybacks instead of reinvestment

 

For the full report summarized in the press release below, see

For previous Forum attention to these issues, see the "Stock Buyback Policy" section of the reference page for the Forum's 2014 project reviewing a buyback controversy. To analyze assumptions relating to proposed stock buybacks in comparison with results of reinvestment of capital in the production of goods and services, see the Forum workshop's  Buyback Analysis tool.

 

Source: The Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi), August 22, 2016 announcement

 

Corporate Directors Identify Four Key Reasons For Stock Buyback Programs

Press Release • August 22, 2016

Buybacks at Highest Level Since Financial Crisis, With S&P 500 Companies Repurchasing $166.3 Billion of Shares in First Quarter of 2016

Webinar on Tuesday, Sept. 13th at 1 PM ET to Review Findings

NEW YORK, NY, August 22, 2016 – As large American public corporations repurchase company shares at historic rates, corporate directors cite four key reasons for buybacks: to return capital to shareholders; invest in the company’s shares; offset dilution from using equity as currency; and/or alter the company’s capital structure. The directors generally disagree with widespread criticism of corporate stock buybacks, and say that companies need to better disclose the reasons for undertaking buybacks.

These findings are contained in a new report, Buybacks and the Board: Director Perspectives on the Share Repurchase Revolution, from the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) and Tapestry Networks. A webinar is scheduled for Tuesday, September 13, 2016, at 1 PM ET to review the findings and respond to questions. Register at no charge here. Download the research here.

The research notes that Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 companies acquired $166.3 billion of their own shares in the first quarter of 2016, more than in any other quarter since the financial crisis. For the past nine quarters, more than 370 S&P 500 companies repurchased shares, and S&P 500 companies spent over $1.5 trillion on buybacks during the past three years.

Between 2003 and 2013, S&P 500 companies doubled their spending on share repurchases and dividends. But, at the same time, companies cut spending on investments in new plants and equipment.

“A trillion and a half dollars in buybacks over three years certainly returns capital to shareowners and reduces the number of shares outstanding. That’s why buybacks are popular,” says Jon Lukomnik, IRRCi executive director. “But, some view buybacks as financial engineering to juice short-term corporate performance at the expense of investments that would better grow companies and the economy over the long-term.”

Lukomnik added, “Corporate board directors are charged with making sure buyback programs are well-designed and well-executed. However, there was little information available about how directors themselves analyzed buybacks. Not surprisingly, the research finds that directors believe they do a good job, but they also admit that they could do a better job disclosing the specific reasons for each buyback program to investors.”

 “Decisions about capital return and allocation are among board members’ most important responsibilities,” says Richard Fields, report author and Tapestry Networks principal. “The 44 directors we interviewed take these decisions seriously to ensure share repurchases occur only when in the company’s best interest. But, we find that few companies effectively disclose the strategies and thinking behind buybacks. As a result, few companies get credit for the rigor of their buyback decision-making.”

The report’s key findings are as follows:

  • Companies repurchase shares for four main reasons – to return capital to shareholders; invest in the company’s shares; offset dilution from using equity as currency; and/or alter the company’s capital structure. Directors define what constitutes a successful buyback program differently depending on the reason(s) the buybacks were initiated.

  • Most directors disagree with criticisms of buyback programs. The two most common criticisms are that buybacks jeopardize corporate growth and that they lead to large, unjustified pay packages for executives. Directors, with few exceptions, say that their companies can afford both buybacks and adequate investment. Directors also reported that buybacks do not unjustly enrich senior executives, as compensation plans are adjusted for buybacks.

  • There is room to improve corporate disclosures about share repurchase programs. Few companies publicly disclose details about buyback decision-making and very few state the reasons for a specific buyback program. With regard to executive compensation, though a number of directors mentioned that their companies project how buyback activity will affect earnings per share and adjust targets accordingly, only 20 S&P 500 companies disclose that they do so.

  • Macroeconomic factors make share buybacks attractive. Monetary and fiscal policies and macroeconomic forces have encouraged repurchase programs. Many directors said that they would be unlikely to find enough good opportunities to invest all their companies’ available capital in today’s low- growth, low-interest-rate environment, and that it was often better to return capital to shareholders than to hoard capital or invest in projects with less-than-desired projected returns. Directors also said they tend to prefer buybacks to dividends because they believe a buyback program offers greater flexibility over time.

  • S. tax policies that discourage companies from repatriating foreign cash have also spurred buyback activity. The large build-up of capital in non-US affiliates means that companies have an emergency fund to draw upon should it become necessary. As a result, creditors offer very attractive loans to companies, meaning some corporations are able to engage in almost costless borrowing to fund buyback programs.

To conduct this study on how companies make decisions about share repurchases, Tapestry Networks reviewed available literature and current capital market reports, and interviewed 44 directors serving on the boards of 95 publicly traded U.S. companies with an aggregate market capitalization of $2.7 trillion. The interviews were conducted from August 2015 through May 2016 on a not-for-attribution basis.

Download the full study here. Register for the webinar at no charge here.

The Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute is a nonprofit research organization that funds academic and practitioner research enabling investors, policymakers, and other stakeholders to make data-driven decisions. IRRCi research covers a wide range of topics of interest to investors, is objective, unbiased, and disseminated widely. More information is available at www.irrcinstitute.org

Tapestry Networks helps corporate leaders become more effective and more confident in carrying out the challenging task of governing and leading the world’s largest companies. We do this by bringing together non-executive directors, regulators and executives from North America and Europe, to learn from one another and to discuss their role. For well over a decade our cross-sector networks of audit committee chairs, compensation committee chairs, lead directors, and our networks of top leaders in banking, insurance and healthcare, have been advancing the state of the art of governance and leadership.

Media Contacts:

Kelly Kenneally | +1.202.256.1445 | kelly@irrcinstitute.org | @IRRCResearch

Richard Fields | +1.781.290.2292 | rfields@tapestrynetworks.com | @leadcomp

© 2016 IRRCi. All Rights Reserved.

 

 

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